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STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
-VS.,.., 
PAUL BUDDY ST o CLAIR, 
Defendant and Appellanto 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
Noo 14962 
An information charging Paul Buddy St(t Clair with 
the crime of murder in the first degree was filed on 
September 14, l953c A motion for a change of venue was 
filed with the court on September 14, 1953, on the grounds 
that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Tooele 
County o This motion was denied by the court anq a plea of 
not-guilty was entered by the defendant, and the case 
came on for trial on January 12, 1954o The jurors found 
the defendant guil~ of murder in the first degree and 
an appeal was taken to this court o· This court ordered 
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Salt Lake City, County of Sa~t Lake, Utah, with the 
Honorable A. Ho Ellett presiding() The case came on 
for trial on November 15th, 19550 
The jury was duly impanelled and sworn in and the 
State proceeded to offer testimony in support of the 
charges of first degree murder as alleged in the infor-
mationo The testimony disclosed that Paul St«> Clair 
went to the home of the deceased, Vesta Wittke, at 
about 1~15 A0M0 on the morning of Ju~ 6th, 1953~ 
There is a great deal of conflicting testimony as to 
what occurred there, but it is certain that Mrs«> Wittke 
was shot three times and died from these wounds at about 
11:05 P.Mo that same day. (R@ 97) 
Dro Wallace Johnson testified on behalf of the State 
that he examined Mrse Wittke early on the morning of 
July 6th, 1953; that he found two wounds having the 
appearance of bullet holes, and that she was then in 
critical conditione (RG> 96) He stated in his opinion 
that death resulted from gunshot wounds$ (R. 100) He 
later removed the two bullets from the body and turned 
them over to the Tooele County Sheriff0 (R~ 98) 
Patricia Wittke testified that she had known the 
defendant about one year, that he had boarded with the 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wittke familY in Grantsville and also in Pine C~on, 
the last time being about Thanksgiving of the previous 
rear. She further testified that on the night of Julf 
5th, 1953, she had left the home about 4~30 P~MG to go 
on a dateo She returned about 11~30 PoM~, talked with 
her mother for awhile (Ro 114) and she and her mother 
{deceased) went to bedo Patricia and her mother slept 
in the same bed" She was later awakened and looking up 
she saw defendant at the foot of the bed with a gun in 
his hando (Ro 115) She heard her mother say, ~ God, 
Paul don't~" She onlY heard one shot fired, (Ro 116) 
crawled over the foot of the bed and grabbed Paul's haire 
She and her mother, the deceasedj struggled with Paul. 
PatrieiaWs older brother, Daytonj was called and he came 
into the bedroom and took the gun a~ from Paul, hold-
ing it on himo Dayton told Patricia to get his e22e 
This she did, loaded it and brought it back to Daytone 
The deceased asked Patricia to go call Fay, meaning 
Fay Gillette the Sheriff~ Patricia then told the next 
door neighbor Bruce Sagers to call Fay as she did not 
know the numbero The Wittke home did not have a tele-
phone0 Patricia upon returning home found Dayton and 
Jack (a younger brother)on the front porche The 
defendant was gone o She went in to her mother, now 
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on the bed, who asked her if she had called the ambul-
ance or doQtoro Upon being told nog the deceased told 
her to call. one$ (Ro 123) She again ran to Sagers and 
Mr. Sagers informed her that the Sheriff had taken care 
of that" 
Dayton Wittke testified that about two d~s before 
the shooting his mother came in and got him out of bed 
during the night and told him to go call the Sheriff 
in order to get St «> Clair out of the house$ He went 
into the kitchen where his mother and Paul were. Paul 
kept asking for the keys to his car, which Vesta had 
taken, and Vesta said she would not give them to him 
until the Sheriff got thereo A scuffle ensued, during 
which time Mrso Wittke hit Sto Clair two }2.!: three times 
~ the head with ~ stove poker while Dayton held Paul's 
arms behind his backa (R$ 151) 
On the night of July 5th~ 1953, Dayton retired 
about 11:00 PeMo He was awakened about 1~30 A.M. of 
the 6th by Patricia!s screamingo Upon entering his 
mother's bedroom he saw his mother and Patricia 
grappling with Paul, who finally sat down in a rock-
ing chair~;> Dayton took the gun from defendant, who 
then said, "Go ahead and shoot meo'! Dayton pointed 
the gun at him, pulled the trigger, but the gun mis-
firec ---~:-;;- ,-~~::~~~-;;;..;,;W;:-\<0;:;.;;-:-:;~~--~ '~he o22, which she did' 
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and he held this on the defendant~ During thi~ _ time 
the defendant repeatedly kept saying~ ''Go ahead -and 
shoot me." (Ro 155-6) Defendant subsequently walked 
out through the kitchen and the front dooro Dayton's 
brother Jack came in and Dayton told him to get the 
shotgun, he then followed Paul with both guns and took --
! shot at Paul's ~ with the o 22 ~ he drove away C) 
(R. 156) 
At this time Patricia returned from the Sagers 
and informed Dayton that his mother had been shot~ 
Dayton had not known about the shooting until this 
time~ He then went into the house and stayed with his 
mother until she was taken to the hospit&lo (Ro 156) 
The testimony of Mr4) Sam J 0 Walters, now dec-
eased, was read into the record on the basis of his 
prior testimony in the first trial of this ca.seo He 
testified that the defendant came to his home the 
night before the shooting and borrowed a gun and shells 
from him0 Ste Clair told him he was going to go target 
shooting with a friendo (Ro 194) 
Mro Bruce Sagers, a next door neighbor of the 
Wittkes!, testified that he heard what he thought were 
firecrackers earlY the morning of July 6, 1953o (Re 187) 
-5-
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He then heard screaming and opened the door and met 
Patricia thereo "She said that Paul had shot her 
mother~" (Ro 187) He then called Sheriff Fay 
Gillette and went to the Wittke home with Patricia$ 
When he came into Vesta~s bedroom~ she said, '~ruce, 
before I pa.ss out~ I would like you to know what 
happened(iln She said-9 t!Paul carne in and turned on the 
light and began shootingo He said, 'This is pay day, 
Vesta.' and began shootingottl (Ro 189) Mro Sagers was 
told by ~~So Wittke to see if he could quiet the 
childreno Mro Sagers further testified that he had 
seen Paul in and around the house shortly after they 
moved to Pine Canyono 
Mro Fay Gillette, the Sheriff of Tooele County, 
testified as to two separate incidentso First he 
testified that he picked up the defendant shortly after 
he had been beaten over the head by the deceased with 
a poker, and that in his opinion he was drunk at the 
timeG (Ro 199) While he was taking the defendant to 
Tooele to have his head stitched and bandaged the 
defendant said he would get even with that little son 
of a b ..... =>-- 9 Dayton, and that there would be a pay day 
for Vestae 
-6--
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He also testified that he had seen Vesta on July 5, 
195.3, in .his home and that her physical appearance was 
good but that she appeared worriedo (Ro 201) 
Upon his arriving at the Wittke home on the night 
of the shooting, he found Vesta in bed with two bullet 
holes in her bodyo He also found a bullet hole in the 
headboard of the bed apd in the east wall of the bed-
room~ He found a gun on top of the dresser with five 
shells in it, three of which had been fired; and the 
one under the firing pin having been hit by the firing 
pin, but had not fired and one that was intact. (R. 211) 
He further testified that the defendant was picked 
up by him about 4~30 PoM~ of July 6, 1953, and taken 
into custody* 
Mr. Joseph Ao Shields~ called by the defense, 
testified that Ste Clair approached him on the night 
of July 3, 1953, and said that he -vas hurt ct He was 
going to take St~ Clair to the doctor when Sheriff 
Gillette arrivede 
Dre Phillip J o Antrim's prior testimony was read 
into the record upon stipulation of counsele Dr. 
Antrim testified that he sewed up the wounds of the 
defendant on the night of the beating; there were 
-7-
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two wounds; one was th~ee inches long and the other 
was one inch longo He further testified that he 
observed no indication of intoxication on the part of 
the defendant. 
Mr. Rex Mueller testified that he had seen the 
defendant on July 4th and that the ·defendant t s head 
was bandaged. He also testified that he had seen the 
defendant with Vesta Wittke numerous times. Also, he 
and St. Clair had gone target shooting together on 
several occasions. (R~ 252) 
Dr. Jack Tedrow, called by the defense, testified 
that he examined the defendant on October 14, 1953, 
and that he found a large lump over the vertex of the 
skull. When asked what the effect of such a blow might 
be on or about July 6th or three days after the beating 
he replied, '~h a person in that condition would be 
what we would term hyperirritability"' That is, he 
would respond more to certain action than he would 
ordinarily. He would be in less control of his temper. 
He would probably be bothered more by loud noises; 
more easily irritated, you would say, and certainly 
not able to reason in his normal capacity9" (R. 273) 
The defendant took the stand in his own behalf 
and testified as to the incidents that lead up to his 
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being hit with the poker and things incident thereto. 
He testified as to the shooting itself0 He stated 
that he went home in response to an earlier phone call 
by Vesta telling him she wanted to see him0 Upon 
arriving at the Wittke home he entered by way of the 
unlocked screen door, he didn!t find Mrs$ Wittke on 
the love seat or dufold so he went into her bedroom. 
{R. 286) He turned on the light, and Mrs. Wittke said, 
'~ou finally got hereQ" (R0 287) He asked her what 
she wanted and she informed him she regretted the 
beating and that she wanted things as they were before. 
(R. 287) Defendant said that he wouldn't do this and 
that he wasn't going to continue their relationship. 
He didn't want anything to do with her. He informed her 
that she could add the hospital bill she caused by the 
beating to what she already owed him~ To this she said, 
"if this is - - - I don't owe you anything, Paul~" She 
said, '~ou have been well paid0 Remember?" (R. 288) 
Defendant then testified that from this conversation 
until he found himself sitting on the edge of the chair, 
with Dayton standing over to the right of him and the 
gun lying on the bed 1 he remembers nothing. (R. 288) 
He stated that he did not remember anything said to him; 
during the time of the shooting, Dayton's picking up 
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the gun, pointing it at him and pulling the trigger, nor 
Patricia and Vesta's hitting him and pulling his hair. 
(R. 289) He left in his car and drove in the vicinity 
of Wendover and Magna, Utah, and was apprehended late 
in the afternoon of July 6, 1953, near Tooele, Utah, 
by Sheriff Gilletteo 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Io 
The court erred in giving instruction number 15 
/ 
because it failed to clearly and properly distinguish 
between first and second degree murder. 
II. 
The court erred in admitting certain physical 
evidence which ·was prejudicial to·the defendant. 
IIIe 
The court erred in not permitting Sheriff Gillette 
to testify as to the meaning of threat~ing wrds. 
stated br the defendant three nays before the alleged 
murder. This was error because the meaning of the 
words were not submitted to the jury in their proper 
context. 
The evidence is legally insufficient to support 
the verdict of first degree murder0 
'11"\ 
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ARGUMENT 
lo 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO CLEARLY AND PROPERLY DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDERo 
This court has repeatedly stated that 'Where 
possible the use of technical legal terms and cumber-
some definitions thereof should be avoided so that the 
laymen on the jury can understand themo State v. 
Thompson, __ u., __ , 170 Po 2d 153, 162, and citations 
therein. The instructions, as given in this ca$e, 
defining the elements of first degree murder and 
second degree murder for the jur,y do not follow this 
eourtts previous admonitiono Second degree murder is 
defined in such similar terminology that it is ex~ 
tremely difficult for anyone to see any difference. 
Instruction number 14 defines firs~ degree 
murder and we do not question its accuracy~ However, 
instruction 15 fails to properly define second degree 
' 
murder so as to distinguish it from first degree murder. 
Instruction number fifteen was given as follows: 
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" You are further instructed * * * First, that on 
or about the 6th day of July, 1953, at Tooele County, 
State of Utah~ the defendant killed Vesta Wittke. 
Second, that the killing was with malice afore-
thought. Third~ that the defendant intended !t_2 
.kill V·esta Wittke but that he did not deliberate _ 
_2!:. premeditate uponkilling:-ort'hat the· 
defendant did not intend to kill Vesta Wittke but 
that he did intend to do great bodily harm to 
Vesta Wittkeo Fourth~ that the said killing was 
unlawfulo Fifth~ that the killing was felonious. 
Sixth, that the said Vesta Wittke died within a 
year and a day after the cause of death was admin-
isteredo" (emphasis added) 
' In distinguishing between first and second degree 
murder it is essential that the necessar,y elements for 
each be set forth and clearly defined so the jurors will 
be able to intelligently reach a just verdict. 
It is clear that if appellant is to be found 
guilty of first degree murder he must fall within 
category one as defined in State Vo Russell, 106 U. 116, 
145 Po2d 1003~ 1QQ8g 
n Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in 
wait £!:..any other kind 2f 'Willful~ .deliberate, 
malicious §fid premeditated killing ~ murder 
in the· first degree.n (emphasis added) 
(76-3~3 UoCoAo 1953) 
The elements of first degree murder within 
categor,y one are: 
lo Unlawful killing_ of a human being, 
2o With malice aforethought~ 
3o With premeditation5J and deliberation, 
4o With specific intent to kill the person killedo 
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The aerinition of the aforesaid elements is 
absolutely necessary in order to avoid confusing the 
jurors with second degree murder; for second degree 
murder does not require premeditation~ deliberation, 
or the specific intent to kill the person killed, while 
first degree murder under category one doese 
To be guilty of second degree murder, all the jury 
need find is that the defendant intended to do great 
bodily harm or to do an act lmowing the reasonable and 
natural consequences thereof would be likely to cause 
death or great bodily injury o It is important to note 
that s_pecific intent to kill the person killed is nat 
necessaryo Also in second degree murder~ malice afore-
thought refers to a design thought out beforehand to 
do great bodily harm or to do an act knowing great 
bodily injury or death might naturally followo 
State Vo Trujillo~ ~Uo ~ 214 Po2d 626o 
First degree murder goes much farther, for it 
requires that not only must malice aforethought be 
present, but also ~he defendant must cociDy_ and calmly 
conceive a plan to kill the particular person (under 
category one which is the division under which the 
defendant was tried) o 
Applying this distinction to the facts of this 
case · · "' -~ ,_ -~~~ ,_ :::::, ~arefully and fully 
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appr~sea 't nat, u· ,tjUCid.y St e Clair went to the home of 
VestaWittke to do great bodily harm or commit an act 
which might naturally tend to do great bodily injury 
or to kill her~ they must find the defendant not guilty 
of first degree murder but guilty of second degree 
murdero If.s> however~ the jury finds that the defendant 
went to the home of Vesta Wittke with a :specific intent 
to kill Vesta Wittke and did plan to kill and did in 
fact ld.ll her :1 they may find the def enda.nt guilty of 
murder_ in the first degree under category one o 
Not only did the court not clearly distinguish 
between the specific intent to kill the person killed 
and the intent merely to do great bodily harm or to do 
an act tending to naturally kill or do great bodily 
harm but also inserts the elements of premeditation 
and deliberation into the second degree definitiono 
It is true that instruction number 15 says that second 
degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforethought but witho~t deliberation 
and premeditation; however the fact that the terms 
"deliberate" and 8Bpremedit ate us are included in a 
negative fashion would naturally cause the jury to 
attempt to make distinctions that courts themselves 
cannot satisfactorily makeo D-eliberation-and 
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premea1tat1on to be clearly presented to the jur.y should 
be limited to the affirmative definition of first degree 
murder and not the negative definition of second degree 
murder. To include the terms in both definitions is to 
cause confusiono 
This is true because of the great difficulty in 
adequate~ and concisely distinguishing between malice 
aforethought 9 premeditation and deliberationo These 
terms are used so interchangeably that for the court to 
say you must find malice aforethought but not deliber~ 
ation or premeditation is to cause the jurors to ask 
themselves what the difference is~ for they all refer 
to degrees of planning and weighing a proposed activity. 
Justice Wade 9s opinion in State Vo Russell, supra, at 
page 1009 makes it clear that it is almost impossible 
to distinguish between malice aforethought 9 premeditation 
or deliberationa 
''How can an act be done with "Malice aforethought 
but without deliberation and premeditation? All 
three of these italicized terms are usual~ used 
interchangeably and with the same meaningo The 
ter.ms premeditation and aforethought both mean to 
think out~ plan or design beforehando Some courts 
make a slight distinction between those terms and 
the term deliberation holding that it requires 
more calmness of mind and coolness of blood for 
deliberation than merely to premeditate and think 
out beforehand~ but other courts refuse to make 
such a distinction o There can be no distinction 
in the length of time required to think out 
agl5= 
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ueLorenana~ 1n premeditation and deliberation. 
Such instruction was certainly confusingo" Cases 
cited thereino 
Therefore, because instruction number fifteen fails 
to clearly distinguish second degree murder and first 
degree murder under category one as to malice afore-
thought~ deliberation~ premeditation and specific in-
tent, the defendant was prejudiced and should be granted 
a new trial in which the jury would not be confused by 
an improper instruction as set forth aboveo 
IIo 
THE COURT ERRED IN AD~UTTING CERTAIN PHYSICAL 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT 
The defendant us knife rnarkei as exhibit 12 was 
admitted in as evidence by the court; yet the F oBoi. 
report read as follows: 
n No foreign deposits of metal or paint were found 
on the blades or in the blade recesses of the 
pocket knife~ specimen Q=7~ which could be ident-
ified as having come from the section of the screen, 
specimen K=2o None of the individual cut strands 
of wire in the screen contain tool markings suit-
able for identification purposeso It was not 
possible, therefore~ to associate by tool marking 
comparisons the knife~ Q~7~ as the tool used to 
cut the submitted screen~ K=2en (Ro 217) 
From this report it is evident there was no rele-
vancy or a proper nconnecting upn between the knife 
found on the defendant and the screen door to the 
c=1hc= 
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Wittke nome Which was ripped openo Despite this expert 
testimony the court interjected its conclusions between 
the knife and the cut in the screen door. (R216) 
"THE COURT: Well, you would hardly expect the harder 
blade of a knife to leave a part of its metal on soft 
copper wireo I would think you would look for the 
soft metal on the hard metalo 99 
Clearly this was prejudicial ·to the defendant's rights 
because the courtRs comments on the evidence certain~ 
misled the juryo 
The screen itself was improperly admitted on two 
grounds: 
First, there was no evidence or testimony that the 
defendantns knife was used to cut the screen dooro 
Second~ there was no testimony or evidence that would 
establish that the screen door was cut from the outside 
or that the defendant may have cut ito In fact the 
photograph of the screen (exhibit 7) and the screen 
itself indicates there is a high probability that the 
screen was cut from the insideo 
There is no doubt that the screen door was introduced 
to show the willful intention of the defendant to gain 
entrance to the Wittke home and thereby place him in a 
position where he could commit the alleged murdero 
F·or the court to admit the knife and screen was to 
improperly set up a chain of circumstances which would 
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impress 'tine JUry Wl.th the idea that the defendant left his 
car, took out his pocket_ knife~ cut the screen door from thE 
out. side~ unlatched the screen door and then entered the 
home and shot and killed Vesta. Wittkeo This was extremely 
prejudiciale It is granted that the defen~ant's posses-
sion of the knife coupled with the fact that the screen was 
cut raises some possibility that the defendant used his 
knife to cut the screen~ but there was no evidence or 
testimony introduced which connects the knife to the cut 
in the screen door or that the defendant did cut the 
screeno It is supposition unsupported by the evidenceo 
Evidence which has no tendency to establish the guilt 
or innocence of accused.? and which~ .if effective at all, 
could only serve only to prejudice or mislead~ or excite 
the minds and inflame the passion of the jury should 
not be admittedo 22 CoJoS 922 
The improper admission with its necessary inferences 
established for the jury that the defendant acted will~ 
fully~ with deliberation premeditation, and malice 
aforethought o 
Not only did the court improperly admit the physical 
evidence but it committed greater error by commenting on 
the evidence it self o There can be no doubt that a juror 
would give considerable weight to comments made from the 
bene-
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ln V1ew or the aforesaid statements it seems clear 
that it was error for the court to admit and comment on 
the physical evidence improperly admittede 
IIIo 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING SHERIFF GILLETTE 
TO TESTIFY AS TO THE MEANING OF THREATENING WORDS STATED 
BY THE DEFENDANT THREE DAYS BEFORE THE ALlEGED MURDERe 
THIS WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE MEANING OF THE WORDS WERE NOT 
SUBMITTED IN THEIR PROPER CONTEXT$ 
Sheriff Gillette testified that Paul Sto Clair told 
him three days before the alleged murder that " he was 
going to get even with that little son of a b~~Dayton 
and there would be a pay day for Vestao" o These words 
are extremely important as to the degree of the offense 
in this caseo In particular they go to the elements of 
willfulness~ premeditation, deliberation and malice 
ar orethought e 
The following is What Sheriff Gillette stated on 
cross examinationg {Ro 222) 
" Q Did you have any conversation at all with him 
on the way over there? 
A From Shieldsesn to ~ ~ 
Q Yes, from Shieldsu over to Wittkesne 
A ~ ~the Wittke home? I donut recall what we 
talked about~ it was just a short distance~ 
and I donnt know whether I ~ = 
Q Just general conversation? 
c=lQc= 
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A ~ 1magine that 6s all it was I donnt recall 
anythinge 
On page 223 of the record the question is put to 
Sheriff Gillette~ 
" Q Now these words that you took as threats~ did 
you consider them as threats at the time? 
A. Well~ he_ was angry and hurt, apparently hurt, 
and intoxicated~ so I just figured that maybe 
they would ease up later ono Some times they doo 
Q Did you = = what did you take those word& as 
meaning at the time when they were said? 
A Well = = = = 
THE COURT~ I wonder ..... em excuse me just a moment, 
Mrc Gillette~ I wonder if that would help the 
jury -as to what this witness took them to mean~ 
I don°t mean to make objections for you~ but I 
am wondering if what he assumed it would mean 
would be of any help to the juryo Wouldnnt it 
be for the jury to assume what was meant? 
MRo BAG~Y I think your honor is right on that, 
I withdraw the questione 111 
Here~ the court assumes that Gillette is assuming what 
the words meant to himo This is improper because Gillette 
himself lmew what the words meant to him and hOif they 
impressed himo This interference by the ·court prejudiced 
the defendant becaus.e it prevented possible testimony to 
the effect that the words were made under such a state of 
mind that St o Clair did not really understand what ~he was 
saying or that he did not intend to carry out the "threats" 
madeo If the words conveyep the impression to Gillette 
that Sto Clair was not serious about the nthreats'' 9 then 
this would lessen the weight of other testimony given as 
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to the premeditation and deliberation on the part of title 
accusedo This goes to the very distinction between first 
and second degree murdere 
This question should have been answeredo A similar 
situation appeared in People Vo Thomas, 25 Cal 2d 880~ 
156 Po2d 7, at page 13 and the court in that case said~ 
" As to the admissions of defendant it is code law 
that evidence of the oral admissions of a party is to 
be viewed with cautiono * * i~ * His statement that 
he had "laid in wait to catch her" apparently refers 
to other occasions when assertedly he had caught her 
going out surreptitiouslye But regardless of whether 
it refers to other occasions or to this occasion, as 
a matter of law it does not on its face and in its 
context justify the claim on behalf of the state 
that it constitutes an admission of lying in wait 
to commit murderou 
Here the meaning of the words stated by the accused 
must be presented to the jury in their proper context to 
avoid a miscarriage of justice0 Most people at one time 
or another say things they do not mean or the words spoken 
are received in a manner in which they were not intendedo 
Conveying_oneus intention~s many times a difficult thingo 
Sheriff Gillette remembered the ver,y words spoken 
by sto Clair but on cross examination stated that it was 
just general conversationc (Re 222) When asked what these 
damaging words meant the court forbids him to say what 
the words meanto This was prejudicial to the defen~anto 
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The court erred in not aJ.lowing Sheriff Gillette to 
state what the defendant meant by these wordse The court 
would be correct in not allowing Gillette to testify as to 
the meaning of the words only if Gillette was drawing a 
eonclusiono He certainly may state what was meant to 
his knowledge or the impression he receivedo The fact 
that Sheriff Gillette said~ ~nr just figured that maybe 
they would ease up later ono Sometimes they doo t9 was 
indicative of the fact that Gillette did not consider the 
words very seriouso Yet~ the jurors were allowed by the 
court to reach the conclusion that defendant intended to 
carry out the threats without first presenting to the jury 
the words in their P!Oper contexte In any event it was the 
duty of the district attorney to object and not the courts o 
=IV= 
THE EVIDENCE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDERo 
.E 
None of the evidence properly before the court~ taken 
separately or together could show that the defendant had 
fulfilled the requirements under1iivision one of the Russell 
case to substantiate first degree murdero It failed to shOlA 
that the defendant had any premeditation as to the shooting, 
that he had a specific intent to kill Vesta Wittke~ that he 
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willfully took her life at the time of the shooting~ or tha1 
he had any malice aforethought to killo The elements as 
set out in instruction number fourteen were not fulfilledo 
In fact the whole atmosphere surrounding the alleged 
murder is that of a ~illing other than first degree murdere 
It appears to be more in the nature of a "lover us quarrel" o 
From the evidence it is quite clear that Paul and 
Vestans relationship was not that of an ordinary boarder 
in a homee 'Thes·e- two had had a great affection for one 
another or they wouldn~t have seen each other after Paul 
left the Wittke home near Thanksgiving Day of 1952o 
The evidence clearly shows that Sto Clair took the 
gun with him to the Wittke home for his o11m self protecc:o 
tione He knew from the beating he suffered a few days 
before that Vesta and Dayton were dangerous and could 
cause great bodily har.me 
The conduct of Dayton Wittke certainly shows a great 
deal of bias against this defendanto Dayton helped his 
mother beat up Sto Clair and then two days later he came 
into his motherns bedroom and attempted to kill the 
defendant; he took the pistol9 pointed-it at Sto Clair~ 
pulled the trigger~ but fortunately it misfiredo He then 
called for an arsenal of guns from Pat and Jacko He then 
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followed Paul out of the house holding a shotgun and a 
e22 on himo As the defendant drove away Dayton fired a LE 
o22 shot into PaulUs car hitting the front door panel on 
the driverus sid-eo Dayton~ doing all qf this shooting 
before~ even knew- that ~.mot~ had been shoto (Italics 
ours) Bruce Sagers testified as to what Dayton said as 
#ollows ~ n -~ * When Paul was here I didn o t know Mother 
had been shot o ~ 8 He said 9 91If I had done ?J I would probe=> 
ably have shot Paul tooo u (Rol93) 
Paul St o Clair went to the Wittke home to talk to 
Vesta Wittkeo It seems in all probability that he took 
the gun with him so that he could ward off another beating •. 
Paul did not go there with a preconceived plan or design 
to kill Vesta Wittkeo The malice aforethought as required 
under the Russell case is that the killing must be thought 
out beforehand and not just the maliceo This element is 
missing in this caseo 
The fact that Patricia only heard one shot certainly 
allows some credibility to St o Clair 0 s testimony that he 
and Vesta Wittke talked for some time before the shooting 
took placeo Actually there were three shots firede 
If this had been a cool, claculated.r> premeditated 
murder would he have shot Mrso Wittke with Patricia in 
the same bed? Did he plan. to have a witness present when 
the . ,,;...,;~)~~-~-¥~~~~~~ have an avenue of escape 
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thougni out beforehand so that he could . get to his car and 
l1lake a get away? All of these questions are answered in the, 
negativeo 
It is clear that after the alleged murder Sto Clair 
sat in a chair~ dumb ·founded 9 and made no pretense to 
escapee Was this reaction the cool.9 ·ealculatedJ) pre=-
meditated act of a planned and designed murderer? 
The evidence fails to show that the defendant thought 
this crime out with the cool and deliberate state of mind 
that is required under the case of People Vo Hillman, 
The court 0s error in admitting into evidence the knife; 
which wasnot connected with the alleged cutting of the 
screen; the screen itself certainly prejudiced the rights 
of this defendanto Improperly admitted evidence, as was 
the case here~ cannot help but have its effect upon the 
juryo 
The Court 0 s failure to permit Sheriff Gillette to 
testify as to what he thought the damaging words meant 
to him prejudiced this defendanto 
The C:ourt 0 s failure to properly instruct the jury 
as to the distinction between first degree m~der and 
second degree murder confused the jury and prejudiced 
the defendantRs CaUSeo 
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For the above stated reasons we feel t·hat the evidence 
just does not support a verdict of first degree murder~ 
therefore we respectfully request that the verdict of the 
jury be set aside and a new trial granted or in the alter-
native that_. this court modify the verdict based upon the 
evidence as a matter of lawo 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clayton Lo Simmons 
John Co Beaslin 
Henry S" Nygaard 
Attorneys far Defendant 
'·and Appellant 
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• Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief 
of the Defendant and lppellant acknowledged this __ _ 
day of Ju~~ 1956~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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